CVE-2026-85249
Camel-Tika: header injection - metadata parsed out of the submitted document was mapped onto the Exchange as headers without filtering, so the document could set headers the route relies on, such as CamelFileName
Description
The Tika producer mapped every metadata key parsed out of the submitted document onto the Exchange as a header, with no filter applied. Document metadata is attacker-controlled content: the party that supplies the file chooses the metadata keys it carries. A crafted document could therefore set Exchange headers that the rest of the route depends on, including headers in the Camel namespace such as CamelFileName, which downstream components use to decide where content is written. The pattern is the same header-injection class as the consumer advisories published previously, reached here through parsed file content rather than through a protocol header.
Mitigation
Credit
This issue was discovered by Claude Security Scan Tool
Notes
The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24423 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25819 (commit b6f6b4708543677a8b6032304c66cbe7f687a2fb), backported to camel-4.22.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25940 (commit 260989268cbc6d258b1fcba63770be8ebbec40cb) and to camel-4.18.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25942 (commit af1efbcccf5882b1ef0094db718972da3190e7e9).
The issue is classified as CWE-20 Improper Input Validation. The camel-4.14.x line reached end of life before this fix and does not receive it; deployments on 4.14.x should move to 4.18.5 or later.