CVE-2026-85243
Camel-Crypto-PGP: integrity verification downgrade - the modification detection code was verified only when the message used the integrity protected packet, so a sender choosing the legacy packet skipped the check entirely
Description
unmarshal() verified the modification detection code only when the message was an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data packet. The older symmetrically encrypted data packet carries no such code, and OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without one, so a message using that packet skipped the check altogether. The packet type is chosen by whoever produced the message, which left the sender - or anyone able to rewrite the message in transit - deciding whether the integrity check applied at all. The existing integrity option governs marshalling only and had no decrypt-side counterpart, so a deployment could not require integrity protection on the messages it accepted.
Mitigation
Credit
This issue was discovered by Claude Security Scan Tool
Notes
The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24441 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25848 (commit 9d3108def6e8344f65a70ee86832b8f5237bc82d), backported to camel-4.22.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25944 (commit 95b4c1500001bc32877df5b8fca0bc7bdd080666) and to camel-4.18.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25946 (commit 4ec9b37d70b08c478966000fb1bd653abfe410e3).
The issue is classified as CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value. The camel-4.14.x line reached end of life before this fix and does not receive it; deployments on 4.14.x should move to 4.18.5 or later.