CVE-2026-84178
Camel-OAuth: login cross-site request forgery - the authorization code callback was not bound to the flow that started it, so a code obtained in any browser could be redeemed at the callback and bound to whichever session presented it
Description
The authorization code callback did not carry a state parameter binding it to the authorization request that started the flow, and the callback did not verify one. An authorization code obtained in any browser could therefore be redeemed at the callback and associated with whichever session presented it, which is login cross-site request forgery: a victim can be silently signed in as an identity the attacker controls, so that actions the victim then performs, and data they then submit, land in the attacker's account. The same unvalidated callback handling also allowed the post-authentication redirect target to be influenced, giving an open redirect from a trusted origin. The state check runs before the authorization code is redeemed, so these paths are reachable without any interaction with the identity provider.
Mitigation
Credit
This issue was discovered by Claude Security Scan Tool
Notes
The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24437 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details.
The fix was merged on main in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25821 (commit 495c5ad39a0f95f823da512b38da5c19609e2a1c), backported to camel-4.22.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25944 (commit 95b4c1500001bc32877df5b8fca0bc7bdd080666) and to camel-4.18.x in https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25946 (commit 4ec9b37d70b08c478966000fb1bd653abfe410e3).
The issue is classified as CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). The camel-4.14.x line reached end of life before this fix and does not receive it; deployments on 4.14.x should move to 4.18.5 or later.