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title: "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2025-27636"
date: 2025-03-09T04:30:42+02:00
url: /security/CVE-2025-27636.html
draft: false
type: security-advisory
cve: CVE-2025-27636
severity: MODERATE
summary: "Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering"
description: "This vulnerability is only present in the following situation. The user is using one of the following HTTP Servers via one the of the following Camel components: camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http and camel-netty-http and in the route, the exchange will be routed to a camel-bean producer. So ONLY camel-bean component is affected. In particular: The bean invocation (is only affected if you use any of the above together with camel-bean component) and the bean that can be called, has more than 1 method implemented. In these, limited and particular, conditions an attacker could be able to forge a Camel header name and make the bean component invoking other methods in the SAME bean. The vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with 'Camel', 'camel', or 'org.apache.camel.'. This vulnerability is present in Camel's default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific
headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, to call another method
on the bean, than was coded in the application. In the camel-jms component, then a mallicous header can be used to send
the message to another queue (on the same broker) than was coded in the application.

The attacker would need to inject custom headers, such as HTTP protocols. So if you have Camel applications that are
directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include malicious HTTP headers in the HTTP requests
that are send to the Camel application.

All the known Camel HTTP component such as camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http, and camel-netty-http would be vulnerable out of the box. 

In terms of usage of the default header filter strategy the list of components using that is: 

camel-activemq
camel-activemq6
camel-amqp
camel-aws2-sqs
camel-azure-servicebus
camel-cxf-rest
camel-cxf-soap
camel-http
camel-jetty
camel-jms
camel-kafka
camel-knative
camel-mail
camel-nats
camel-netty-http
camel-platform-http
camel-rest
camel-servlet
camel-sjms
camel-spring-rabbitmq
camel-stomp
camel-tahu
camel-undertow
camel-xmpp"
mitigation: "Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases. Also, users could use removeHeaders EIP, to filter out anything like 'cAmel, cAMEL' etc, or in general everything not starting with 'Camel', 'camel' or 'org.apache.camel.'."
credit: "This issue was discovered by Mark Thorson of AT&T"
affected: Apache Camel 4.10.0 before 4.10.2. Apache Camel 4.8.0 before 4.8.5. Apache Camel 3.10.0 before 3.22.4.
fixed: 3.22.4, 4.8.5 and 4.10.2 
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The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-21828 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and have more details.
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